Strategic Trading of Forward Contracts in Oligopolistic Industries with Non-storable Commodities by Calcagno, R. & Sadrieh, A.
TILEC Discussion Paper
TILECStrategic trading of forward contracts in
oligopolistic industries with non-storable
commodities∗
Riccardo Calcagno†and Abdolkarim Sadrieh‡
May 28, 2004
Abstract
We introduce demand uncertainty in the model of Allaz-Vila (1993).
Traders’ risk attitude in the forward market crucially determines the de-
gree of competitiveness of the spot market. The higher demand uncer-
tainty the lower the competition-enhancing eﬀect of forward trading.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A well known result by Allaz and Vila (1993) shows that introducing forward
markets for a non-storable commodity reduces oligopolists’ market power, be-
cause at equilibrium engaging in forward sales is a commitment to high output.
Although the strategic insight of their model is very appealing, it is not clear to
which extent it holds in a more realistic setting in which demand is uncertain
and speculators are risk-averse. We believe these assumptions are more realistic
because of the widely observed normal backwardation (i.e. the forward price is
lower than the expected future spot price) which indicates that hedgers pay a
risk-premium in such markets.
We analyze the eﬀects of adding a forward market to a model of oligopolis-
tic competition where the spot demand by retail consumers is uncertain. We
model a market in which a forward contract on the commodity is traded between
producers and speculators. In the special case of risk-neutral speculators, our
model reproduces the result of Allaz and Vila (1993) showing that introducing
forward markets drives the commodity price to the competitive level. In the
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1case of risk-averse speculators, however, we show that this strong result does
not hold. Because speculators require risk compensation, the forward price falls
below the expected spot price, leading the producers to restrain their forward
sales. Our main conclusion is that the competition-enhancing eﬀect of forward
markets decreases as spot market volatility increases due to the increase of
the risk-premium. This indicates that the eﬀectiveness of introducing forward
markets for competition strongly depends on the volatility of demand for the
commodity. Hence, in markets with stable demand (e.g. metals) forward mar-
kets can increase eﬃciency substantially while in markets subject to frequent
exogenous demand shocks (e.g. energy) the opposite applies.
In general, the literature on the competition eﬀects of forward markets (Pow-
ell (1993), Newbery (1995) and (1998), Green (1999)) suggests that long-term
contracts reduce the market power of producers. The only exception is Green
(2003) who independently derives results similar to ours in the context of elec-
tricity markets where forward markets are open only to generators and retailers.
Our analysis allows free entry in the market for forward contracts, also to pure
ﬁnancial speculators.
2 The model
There are two periods and two risk-neutral producers, i and j.A tt i m et =1
the producers and risk-averse speculators k ∈ M buy/sell forward contracts at
the forward price pf.A tt i m et =2as p o tm a r k e tf o rt h eg o o do p e n sa n dt h e
actual production takes place: we assume the commodity is non-storable, so
that it cannot be produced at t =1 . The exchange of the actual commodity
occurs between the producers and consumers with an uncertain, price-sensitive
demand. At the same date t =2the forward contracts are executed.
Forward market
For simplicity, we assume there is no time-discount in the model. The agents
operating in the forward market can buy or sell forward contracts that call for
delivery at time 2. The future realization of the spot market demand is uncertain
when the forward trading takes place.
The equilibrium forward price pf (for one unit of commodity) ﬁxed at t =1
rules out all arbitrage possibilities and clears the forward market.
If the speculators operating in the forward market are risk-averse, they would
trade the quantity hk which maximizes the expected utility of their proﬁts
Πk =( pf − p)hk,w i t hhk > 0 indicating the sales of forwards; assuming they
have mean-variance utility functions with risk-aversion coeﬃcient equal to λk,
we obtain:




Producers’ proﬁts and cost functions
2The proﬁt of producer i at t =2is composed of two elements: the proﬁtf r o m
selling the output at the spot price, pqi−c(qi),a n dt h ep r o ﬁt from the forwards
sold at pf, pffi − c(fi),w i t hfi > 0 indicating a short position in the forward.
We assume that for each producer the cost is ci(xi)=bixi where xi = qi +fi is
the total amount of production taking place at t =2 .
Consumers demand
We assume that consumers’ demand at t =2is known and depends on the
spot price: D = a − p + θ,w h e r ep is the spot price and θ is the realization
of the demand shock e θ. For simplicity, we assume that the random variable e θ
has a binomial distribution {θL,θH} with probabilities {π,1−π}. Moreover, we
normalize E[e θ]=0(so that θL = −1−π
π θH)a n dVa r[e θ]=πθ
2







2.1 Forward market competition à la Cournot
In this section, we characterize the solution of the model in the case the pro-
ducers compete in quantities on the forward market. Section 3 will analyze the
case in which they compete in price.
Notice that on the spot market we always consider competition “à la Cournot”,
because with Bertrand competition the commitment eﬀect of forward contract-
ing disappears (see Green 1999).
We assume that the ﬁnancial speculators who operate on the forward market
are risk-averse, i.e. λk > 0 for all k.
2.1.1 Equilibrium in the spot market
Given the position in forward fi and fj, the producers i and j choose the optimal
quantity to sell on the market at t =2 . The two competitors maximize proﬁts:
Πi = p(θ)qi − bxi =( a + θ − xi − xj)qi − bxi
Πj = p(θ)qj − bxj =( a + θ − xi − xj)qj − bxj
where qi,q j are, respectively, the quantity of commodity sold on the spot market
by i and j,w h i l exi = qi + fi and xj = qj + fj. The reaction functions are:
xi(xj)=
a + θ − b + fi − xj
2
xj(xi)=
a + θ − b + fj − xi
2
The spot market equilibrium, for any given realization of θ,i s :
x∗
i = xi(θ)=









(a + θ) − fi − fj +2 b
3
(4)
3Notice that this equilibrium is the same as in Proposition 2.1 of Allaz-Vila
(1993) once we correct for the realized shock.
Moreover, given (4), the ex-ante Va r(p∗)=1




2.1.2 No-arbitrage condition in the forward market
We now compute the forward price pf that clears the forward market at t =1 ,
given rational expectations of the speculators. Assuming rational expectations
consists in imposing that the speculators take into account the correct spot price
equilibrium formula (4) to decide their optimal exposure in forward contracts.
Given CARA utility functions, the optimal position for speculator k in forward















. The equilibrium forward price pf is such that the
aggregate position of speculators and producers i,j is zero:




+ fi + fj =0
pf − E[p∗]=−ΛVa r(p∗)(fi + fj)
pf = E[p∗] − ΛVa r(p∗)(fi + fj)






H (fi + fj) (5)
The forward price pf in (5) is then the unique non-arbitrage forward price
when speculators have rational expectations.
2.1.3 The choice of optimal forward exposure by the duopolists
Given the forward price pf, the expected proﬁto fp r o d u c e ri at t =1is:
E[Πi]=E[(p∗ − b)(x∗
i − fi)+( pf − b)fi]
= E[(p∗ − b)x∗
i]+( pf − E[p∗])fi
= E[(p∗ − b)x∗
i] − ΛVa r (p∗)(fi + fj)fi







4When the producers compete in quantity on the forward market, i solves for







3 − ΛVa r(p∗)(fi + fj)fi (6)
















































Using (7) and the symmetric condition for j gives us:















which is always lower than the forward position in the solution of Allaz-Vila
(1993) (see their Proposition 2.3).
Proposition 1 If the speculators k ∈ M operating in the forward market
are strictly risk-averse, then the optimal forward position for producers is lower
than the one with certain demand schedule.
The interpretation of this result is simple. Risk-averse speculators buy for-
ward contracts at a price which is lower than the expected spot price. The
discount is proportional to the variance of the spot price. This represents the
premium that risk-averse speculators ask for bearing the price risk. In equilib-
rium the producers will optimally reduce their short forward position because
the cost of selling forwards increases with the risk premium. The lower the short
position of each producer, the lower the degree of competitiveness on the spot
market at t =2 . When demand shocks are highly unpredictable the cost of
selling forwards is so high that the introduction of a forward market has little
improvement on the overall eﬃciency.
52.2 Forward market competition à la Bertrand
Green (1999) argues that a less competitive market in long-term contracts has
less impact on the spot market allocation. He proves that adding a forward
market in which producers compete “à la” Cournot does not change the spot
market allocation. On the other hand, a very competitive forward market, with
competition “à la” Bertrand should produce larger eﬀects on the spot market.
We verify this intuition extending the result of Proposition 1 to the case in
which the producers compete in price in the forward market.
Proposition 2 If the speculators k ∈ M operating in the forward market
are strictly risk-averse, and if the producers compete in prices on the forward
market, then the optimal forward position for producers is lower than the one























and with Bertrand competition on the forward market
df j













The optimal forward position is given by the solution:
fi = −
3aπ − 3bπ − Λθ
2



















Comparing the result in presence of Bertrand competition fB with the result
with Cournot competition, fC = a−b
5+3ΛVa r(θ), we can conclude that fB >f C
and fB <f Allaz−V ila ⇔ 2+2
3ΛVa r(θ) > 5 ⇔ Va r (θ) > 9
2Λ−1. ¥
If the shock e θ has high variance, the forward market does not achieve the
perfectly competitive allocation as in Allaz and Vila (1993) even if it is very
competitive.
63C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we show that introducing forward markets in a duopoly does not
always enhance the perfectly competitive allocation on the spot markets, as in
Allaz and Vila (1993). Their result relies crucially on the absence of any element
of uncertainty over the spot demand of the commodity and on the risk-neutrality
of forward buyers, like ﬁnancial intermediaries. The eﬃciency-enhancing eﬀect
of forward contracts is lower when the demand of the good is very uncertain.
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